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ABSTRACT
This paper is about ‘smart specialization strategies’ as an innovation
(or industrial) policy approach. Being a sector non-neutral policy,
while promoting a bottom-up principle of entrepreneurial initiative
and dynamics, ‘smart specialization strategies’ occupy a particular
place in the innovation policy space. This place is naturally not only
ﬁlled with ‘smart specialization strategies’, but also several other
approaches in development policy and industrial policy share
similar goals and logics. In the paper we will build the innovation
policy space, emphasize two important bifurcations within it and
explain why various policy approaches are located in the same
subspace and what makes them rather similar in terms of
governance principles.
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Research and Innovation Smart Specialization Strategy (RIS3) occupies a particular place
in the innovation and industrial policy space. The main ‘raison d’être’ of RIS3 is to allow
government to undertake strategic actions in order to build future competitive advan-
tages, while preserving or even promoting a bottom-up principle of entrepreneurial
initiative and dynamics. The main challenge for policies located at this particular
place of the policy space is to help governments allocate resources in a non-neutral
logic (advantaging thereby some ﬁelds or domains), while preventing them to behave
as omniscient planners possessing ‘ex ante’ the full knowledge about future desirable
paths of transformation and development of the economy. Of course, this place in the
policy space is not only ﬁlled with RIS3, but also several approaches in development
policy (i.e. Haussmann & Rodrik, 2003), industrial policy (i.e. Aghion, 2012) or
mission-R&D programmes (i.e. Foray, Mowery, & Nelson, 2012) share similar goals
and logics. All these approaches address the tension between the need for strategic
actions undertaken by governments and the need to avoid a central planning mode of
resource allocation and to maintain instead a key role for decentralized entrepreneurial
choices and initiatives.1
In this paper, we will emphasize two important bifurcations in the policy space and
will try to explain why some types of policies (including RIS3) are located in the same
sub-space and what makes them rather similar, at least in terms of governance
principles.
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A ﬁrst bifurcation: between horizontal policies and sector non-neutral
policies (and smart specialization strategies)
During the last decades, horizontal policies dominated the policy process at the regional
level in the European Union (EU). Resources were mostly allocated in a horizontal manner
– in order to avoid any preferential interventions and to act on general framework con-
ditions and generic factors (such as public research infrastructure) which are important
for the whole system. There were exceptions of course, but horizontal policy (or sector-
neutral policy) was the main logic of resource allocation in the framework of regional
and cohesion policy.2
Horizontal policies are good policies! First, they are likely to improve important com-
ponents of the regional system of innovation. Second, they minimize risks inherent in any
policy which selects projects according to preferred ﬁelds (Trajtenberg, 2012). And,
indeed, this sort of policy has the potential to stimulate structural changes through
various mechanisms such as diversiﬁcation in ﬁrms, spin-offs and start-ups, mobility of
people and networking (Boschma & Frenken, 2011).
The failures of horizontal policies in less advanced regions
Although this policy was likely to work in the case of top regions, it did not work in the case
of transition and less advanced regions (Muscio, Rivera Leon, & Reid, 2015; Percoco, 2013).
Most of the less developed regions and transition regions failed to improve the knowledge
gap relative to the top regions. In a few cases, when regions managed to somewhat improve
the knowledge gap, they had difﬁculties to translate it into real economic convergence. This
usually happens when improvement in the knowledge gap is mostly a public sector com-
ponent, with very little effect of the policy in innovation capacities within the private
sector (Veugelers & Mrak, 2009). There is no such thing as a quasi-magical effect of
public research improvement, notably in the form of knowledge spillovers.
Why can one observe such a differentiated impact of horizontal policies between
regions of different levels of development?
Innovation requires not only general framework conditions – ‘the basics have to be
right’ – but also speciﬁc capabilities and resources. In top regions, these capabilities are
provided by industrial associations, large companies, universities and public research
organizations, through spillovers of research, training and diffusion of technologies to
suppliers. These spillovers constitute the complementary capabilities that most Small
and Medium Enterprises can draw on even if they have not contributed to their provision
(Berger, 2013). However, in the other regions, these sources of complementary capabilities
have dried up or have never existed and large holes in the industrial eco-systems have
appeared. To take the words of Suzan Berger: ‘ﬁrms are home alone’, she convincingly
argues: ‘even start ups with great innovation and generous funding cannot do it all in
house. They need suppliers, qualiﬁed workers and engineers, expertise beyond their
own’. In many cases, the ecosystem is too poor to provide all these capabilities.
In less advanced regions policies need to be more speciﬁc and complex
In less advanced and transition regions, regional innovation policy therefore needs to go
beyond horizontal measures and address the whole set of capabilities required to innovate
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in ‘speciﬁc’ sectors and emerging ﬁelds. This reﬂects what Hausmann and Rodrik wrote in
2006:
The idea that the government can disengage from speciﬁc policies and just focus on general
framework conditions in a sector neutral way is an illusion based on the disregard for the
speciﬁcity and complexity of the requisite publicly provided inputs and capabilities.
In other words, a policy is needed to support not only the development of a public research
infrastructure, but also above all the emergence of ‘micro-systems of innovation’: the
network of companies, research institutions, specialized services and complementary
capabilities that are mobilized to explore collectively a certain new domain of
opportunities.3
The following case will help readers to understand the notion of an emerging micro-
system of innovation. This case is that of the footwear industry in Northern Portugal,
which has undergone profound renewal in a context of frantic global competition. The
strategy carried out by the innovation public agency involved the formation of a micro-
system of innovation aiming at the development of new forms of ﬂexible automation in
the footwear industry. The goal was to achieve the integration of engineering knowledge
from the University of Porto, skills of companies specialized in industrial machinery, tools
and software, as well as the entrepreneurial vision of a few footwear manufacturing ﬁrms
which have a good understanding of the urgent need for revival via innovation. The inte-
gration of this knowledge facilitated exploration of the potential for automation associated
with advanced cutting tools to increase the ﬂexibility and quality of production. Economic
experimentation with these technological developments determined a new business
model. The latter is based on an increase in the variety of designs and the capacity to
rapidly respond to small orders. This development has led one segment of the footwear
industry to bypass global competition and become the second most important European
producer in terms of exports and value added.
In this example we see the development of a new activity or speciality, complementing
the existing structures and assets in order to open and explore new opportunities to trans-
form these structures. Such a process can be described as a smart specialization. What is
prioritized here is not a sector (the footwear industry), but a mode of transformation of
this sector: a process that does not involve the whole industry but the network of ﬁrms,
services and research that collaborate to explore a new route for structural change.
This is not a cathedral in the desert here, but knowledge-based activities that are
embedded in and complementing existing structures in order to transform them. A
smart specialization process, which involves the emergence and growth of a micro-
system of innovation, represents, therefore, another mechanism for structural changes –
perhaps more effective and powerful – in certain types of regional economies. In this
case, one can realistically hope for real economic impact since it involves not only sup-
ported research, but also the whole micro-system.
The notion of smart specialization, therefore, deﬁnes a virtuous process of diversiﬁca-
tion through the local concentration of resources and capabilities in a certain number of
new domains that represent possible paths for the transformation of productive structures.
Smart specialization processes reﬂect the capacity of an economy to generate new activities
aiming at transforming the structures. These processes can be spontaneous when ﬁrms
and other agents have enough capabilities and incentives to open and explore new
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domains of opportunities. In many cases, however, several obstacles and difﬁculties hinder
such spontaneous processes from arising. In such instances, there is a need for a smart
specialization ‘strategy (or policy)’. This involves putting in place a policy process
whereby this sort of new speciality development dynamic can be facilitated.4
The example from Northern Portugal also helps to understand that a smart specializ-
ation strategy does not necessarily reﬂect the increase of the relative weight of an industry.
It does not aim either at narrowing down the development path of a region or producing
some sort of technological monoculture. Smart specialization strategies reﬂect rather the
capacity of an economic system (e.g. a region) to generate new areas of development and
new options through the discovery of new domains of opportunity and the local concen-
tration and agglomeration of resources and competences in these domains.
A smart specialization strategy has thus two faces:
. forming capabilities (building micro-systems of innovation)and
. driving structural changes.
Of course in some cases, it could be possible to import all factors of structural changes.
One can modernize a tourism sector simply by outsourcing the development and appli-
cation of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) solutions to companies
which are not based in a region, and this can be a good sectoral policy; however, this is
not a smart specialization policy. A smart specialization policy addresses not only struc-
tural changes, but also the formation of local capabilities to drive these changes.
If the concept of smart specialization is, therefore, associated with the idea that building
local capabilities has a value – co-location of ﬁrms, research and labour forces in speciﬁc
domains is a fundamental engine of innovation – this value does not mean that smart
specialization is a closed process done for an autarkic region. At any stage in the process,
external knowledge and extra-regional resources are required and need to be mobilized.
A problem of choice: towards a second bifurcation in the policy space
But of course, such a policy has a very different logic than the horizontal policy previously
described. We can call it ‘non-neutral’ (or vertical). It is a very different policy simply
because different activities require different things. Supporting biotechnology develop-
ment for ﬁsheries will require the provision of capabilities in terms of research, suppliers
and services which are very different from those required to support the development of
advanced manufacturing technologies for the footwear industry or to support the devel-
opment of ICT for tourism. Such a policy has to deal with the complexity and speciﬁcity
of each activity and this has a cost. This is ‘haute couture’ rather than ‘ready to wear’. A
horizontal policy such as R&D tax credit is ‘ready to wear’ (it has a cost but is relatively
easy to implement). But providing the speciﬁc capabilities for a speciﬁc emerging activity
is ‘haute couture’ and therefore more costly.
It is, therefore, clear that a local government cannot address all potential speciﬁc capa-
bilities and infrastructure needs for all new activities. This implies that choices need to be
made between different emerging activities or different opportunities. As said forcefully by
Hausmann and Rodrik (2006), ‘it is not that choices are desirable, they are simply
inevitable’.
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A second bifurcation: between central modes of planning and
self-discovery
The new policy logic raises thus a problem which is easy to perceive. This is the problem of
choosing and selecting a few domains of priorities where the emergence of micro-systems
of innovation will be strongly supported and large resources will be concentrated. Indeed,
prioritizing certain technologies or domains always entails a risk because it implies pre-
dicting the future development of technologies and markets.
There is a long history of policies setting priorities and objectives in a top-down and
central planning mode and letting bureaucratic committees decide what was best left to
the market. These policies generated a lot of inefﬁciencies and most often failed to stimu-
late dynamism and innovation. Such an old-fashioned mode of making choices and estab-
lishing priorities was fully used during the golden age of the so-called mission-oriented
policies in the post-war period (from the 1960s to the 1990s). Government viewed itself
as the omniscient planner with ‘ex ante’ knowledge about what to do and what to
choose in terms of sectors and activities. One could argue that a lot of cluster policies –
which clearly display some aspects of innovation systems – are very much top-down
with governments dictating what technologies should be developed in what places (e.g.
the French ‘Pôles de Compétitivité’). Given the potential risks of failure (including
picking winners, policy capture and anti-competitive effect), the scepticism of many econ-
omists about such sector non-neutral policies is fully justiﬁed.
However, the essence of a smart specialization strategy does not lie in taking such
potential risks of failures and distortions as a good reason for abandoning any policy
aiming at supporting the building of capabilities in ‘speciﬁc’ domains. Rather, the
approach of smart specialization is to care seriously about the design of the policy
process so as to minimize all these risks. To summarize, RIS3 recognizes the need for gov-
ernment to be able to make strategic choices and targeted interventions so as to support
the emergence of micro-systems of innovation in speciﬁc domains, but it equally recog-
nizes the need to avoid the usual mistakes frequently associated with top-down decisions
and central planning mode. Thus, the essential question of a smart specialization strategy
is: how can one design a ‘specialization’ strategy – as presented above – without falling
back into a planning mode where government preselects target industries? Dealing with
this challenging question, RIS3 places itself within a speciﬁc zone of the policy space.
Towards good policy design: entrepreneurial discovery and a few other
things
In the perspective of a non-neutral policy, three types of mistakes need to be considered.
‘Mistake type 1’ has already been mentioned: the mistake of the omniscient planner
who knows what to do and what to choose and does not need any grassroots information.
The temptation is high to buy consulting services that will write a nice report using any
kind of ﬁgures and tables and thereby produce the illusion that the government has ‘sufﬁ-
cient information and knowledge’ to decide priorities in a top-down manner. Policy-
makers must guard against the intellectual logic imposed by the principal-agent model,
according to which the principal (the government) knows from the start which specializ-
ations should be developed and therefore conﬁnes itself to setting up incentives for private
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industry to carry out the plan! (Rodrik, 2013). As Sabel said so well: ‘What if, as I and
many others assume, there are no principals…with the robust and panoramic knowledge
needed for this directive role?’ (Sabel, 2004, p. 3). There is a potential mistake here because
the logic of RIS3 is that the smart specializations are not given ‘ex ante’ through some kind
of measurement of relative specialization or critical mass and the strategy would simply
consist in deepening such relative specialization. In RIS3, the smart specializations need
to be discovered among several emerging activities.
‘Mistake type 2’ – this is the mistake of sectoral prioritization. Sector prioritization gen-
erates distortions. There is no point in supporting all ﬁrms of a given sector. The point is
rather to support new activities and projects at a ﬁner level of granularity.
‘Mistake type 3’ – this is the mistake of choices made forever (or, this is the mistake of
making permanent choices). The profound logic of S3 is about generating new options for
further diversiﬁcation and transformation. This is not about deepening existing
specialization.
To minimize the risks of these mistakes which are inherent in any government inter-
vention which selects projects according to preferred ﬁelds, the design of the policy
process becomes a crucial issue.
Centrality of entrepreneurial discovery
Reliance on entrepreneurial discovery means that while policy-makers are asking them-
selves how to develop a unique competitive offer and build capabilities in speciﬁc ﬁelds,
the response is not in building statistical representations of supply and demand, strength
and weaknesses, or related variety measures. Mapping science, technology and industries
at the regional level is indeed a useful exercise, but cannot be used as the main driver or
guidepost for decisions. The fundamental point here is the Hayeckian argument whereby
the knowledge about what to do is not obvious. It is knowledge ‘of time and place’; this is
local knowledge which is dispersed, decentralized and divided. It is hidden and needs to be
discovered. The importance of entrepreneurial discovery is, therefore, related to the rec-
ognition that the government does not have innate wisdom or ‘ex ante’ knowledge
about future priorities. ‘The decisions should rather be informed by the local knowledge,
“of time and place”, and the entrepreneurial knowledge about opportunities, constraints
and challenges.’ In other words, the policy process must create opportunities and incen-
tives for economic agents – ﬁrms, research centres, independent inventors and lead users –
who hold information about the technological and market potentials of new domains and
new activities to communicate that information to the public agency.
To cap it all, ‘entrepreneurial’ means a large category of actors in the innovation
process, based not only in the region but also elsewhere; and ‘discovery’ means really dis-
covery and not an ‘ex post’ qualiﬁcation of a predetermined set of goals. So the discovery
process – discovering which domains of R&D and innovative activities a region should
move into to construct its future in the knowledge economy – forms an integral part of
political action and must be carried out within the framework of strategic interactions
between the government and the private sector.
By opening and exploring new domains of opportunities, the process of entrepre-
neurial discovery is a central tool to ‘solve the information problem that the govern-
ment alone cannot solve’. As such, it is characterized by a strong learning dimension.
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The social value of a discovery is that it informs the whole system that a particular
domain of R&D, innovation and structural change is likely to create new opportunities
(Hirshleifer, 1971).
Based on this information, the government can use various assessment procedures to
select those activities that appear as very promising in terms of future innovations, spillovers
and potentials for the transformation of the existing structures and that have scale or agglom-
eration economies or exhibit the characteristics of coordination failures (Rodrik, 2004). Sub-
sequently, the constitution of scales and criticalmasses of resources as well as the provision of
complementary capabilities will be organized so that a micro-system of innovation can
emerge and the policy process will manage the transition from the entrepreneurial discovery
phase to the growth of the new activity. The right sequencing in a smart specialization strat-
egy is, therefore, ‘from entrepreneurial discovery process to transitory specialisation’.5
Entrepreneurial discovery matters twice!
To understand the great role of entrepreneurial discovery in the design and deployment of
a RIS3 and to understand that such an argument is not artiﬁcial or feigned or forced, we
can conclude that entrepreneurial discovery has two faces:
. First, it is a mechanism to integrate and combine dispersed and fragmented knowledge
in order to open and explore a new domain of (market and technological) opportunity.
As such it is the initial step in many processes of structural changes.
. Second, it is a mechanism to produce information about the value of the considered
domain, in terms of potential innovations, spillovers and structural changes. This infor-
mation should be used by government when the time comes to choose.
To summarize, the process of entrepreneurial discovery is not just about ‘the public sector
needing to talk to business ﬁrms’, as misinterpreted by a few scholars. It involves rather the
tangible exploration of a new domain of opportunities: a concrete discovery that will gen-
erate relevant information for the government to make adequate choices and selection.
Two other design principles
Beyond the entrepreneurial discovery process, two other design elements are important in
order to minimize the risk of government failures (described above).
Priorities are selected at a ﬁner level of granularity than the sectoral level. This ﬁner
level is captured by the notions of ‘new activity’ or ‘emerging micro-system of innovation’.
There is a ‘self-destruction mechanism’ associated with all priorities, through which
support will be discontinued after a certain period of time has elapsed. The right rationale
to discontinue support is not about success or failure, but rather that the considered
activity is no longer new (Foray, 2015; Rodrik, 2004).
Conclusion
In this paperwe have addressed the policy space of smart specialization strategies (Figure 1).
It is a sector non-neutral policy (as opposed to a horizontal and sector-neutral policy),
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which involves a logic of decentralized discovery process (as opposed to principal-agent
governance). This space is not only ﬁlled with this approach. With some nuances,
various kinds of policy approaches can be located in the same space. This is the case of
course for Haussmann and Rodrik’s development policy (2003), the pro-competitive sec-
toral policy of Aghion (2012) (and) some mission-oriented policies (which) address
grand challenges.6 Perhaps Hirschman’s ‘Development Project Observed’ could be ident-
iﬁed as the pioneering study in this strand of policy literature (Hirschman, 1967).7
All these approaches try to address the tension between the need for government to take
things in hand again by developing a vision, deciding about strategic choices which
support some priorities in building future competitive advantages, and the need for decen-
tralized entrepreneurial choices and initiatives. Only a good policy design can help to
address such a tension, and the centrality of self-discovery or entrepreneurial discovery
is obvious in this policy design. Any ‘new’ industrial or innovation policy which would
not include such a provision would have an entirely different character.
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Notes
1. A very simple ﬁgure placed at the end of the paper supports our argument in both Sections 1
and 2.
2. A sector-neutral (horizontal) policy is a policy that addresses problems that are similar to any
company and other innovation actors across sectors and ﬁelds. Such policy aims at improv-
ing general conditions and ﬁxing generic problems, while minimizing the risks of distortions
and government failures.
3. David and Metcalfe (2008) suggest that the term ‘innovation system’ has been misleading in
directing attention to static and durable institutional structures, and argue for greater empiri-
cal and policy relevance of their conceptualization of ‘micro-systems of innovation’ as
Figure 1. The policy space of smart specialization strategies.
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emergent properties of interactions among ﬁrms, research, suppliers and so on which
develop (often only transiently) for the purposes of solving speciﬁc innovation problems.
They write: ‘In a healthy ERA there would be countless numbers of specialized innovation
systems generated at the micro-level; systems that are born and decay as new innovation pro-
blems are posed and solved’.
4. Setting up such a process in every European region has become an important objective of EU
cohesion policy – known as RIS3 (see Foray, 2015; Foray, David, & Hall, 2009; McCann,
2015; McCann & Ortega-Argiles, 2015).
5. As a lesson from the ﬁrst years of practical implementation in EU regions, it seems that inmost
cases, regions proceeded the other way: starting with the predetermination of domains and
areas of potential specialization (based on different types of statistical representations or
problem setting), they then hoped to ﬁnd entrepreneurial discoveries within these domains
(if they are lucky, they will ﬁnd a few)! See Foray and Frenken (2016) to learn under what con-
ditions such a reverse sequencing is relevant (which is notably the case in regions with poor
entrepreneurial capabilities).
6. In ‘Choosing races and placing bets’ (Hughes, 2012), Alan Hughes reports on a policy pro-
posal of the Council of Science and Technology (CST, UK) which shared at least the starting
point of smart specialization. Through this proposal, the CST’s objective was to advise the
Government on ‘what would be the best areas to focus resources for science, technology
and innovation, which could lead to applications with commercial or social beneﬁts in
around 5 years’. The proposal involved various steps to identify priority’ areas, but it did
not refer to any kind of self-discovery principle. I am grateful to one of the anonymous
reviewers who mentioned this reference.
7. I am grateful to Dieter Ernst who mentioned to me the relevance of Hirschman’s works to the
analysis of RIS3 as a policy approach.
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